Are things over with Venezuela? It doesn’t seem so
By Easton Martin | January 28, 2026
Secretary of State Marco Rubio testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 28, 2026, delivering a blunt message to the new leadership in Venezuela. He affirmed that while the United States does not seek a prolonged war, the administration remains “prepared to use force” to ensure compliance from Venezuela’s interim government. Rubio’s declaration follows the dramatic January 3 military operation, Operation Absolute Resolve, which resulted in the capture and extradition of former leader Nicolás Maduro. Rubio’s comments are clear that the removal of Maduro was merely the first phase of a broader strategy to reshape the region’s geopolitical landscape.
The Secretary’s warning was directed squarely at Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, emphasizing that “maximum cooperation” is expected regarding U.S. strategic priorities. Washington has outlined specific expectations, primarily centering on the expulsion of foreign adversaries and the restructuring of Venezuela’s economy. Rubio explicitly stated that the U.S. intends to oversee the sale of sanctioned oil, channeling revenues into a monitored budget while demanding that Venezuelan energy sectors be opened to American corporations. The administration views the removal of Iranian and Russian influence as a critical national security imperative, with Rubio citing specific concerns about foreign military assets within Venezuelan borders.
Given the administration’s reluctance to deploy ground troops, this continued readiness to use force likely points toward a strategy of surgical military pressure. Future actions would probably rely on air and naval superiority rather than occupation. This may manifest as intensified naval blockades to control oil exports or precision airstrikes targeting specific infrastructure deemed a threat, such as the “Iranian drone factories” mentioned during the hearing.
In maintaining a credible threat of kinetic action, Washington appears to be pursuing a policy of “coercive stabilization,” ensuring that the post-Maduro transition aligns strictly with U.S. economic and security interests.